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PUBLIC LAW-MODIFICATION OF CONSENT DECREES-MORE FLEX-
IBLE STANDARD FOR MODIFICATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITI-
GATION. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992).
I. FACTS
In 1971, the inmates of the Suffolk County Jail in Boston, Massa-
chusetts1 filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 al-
leging violations of their constitutional rights attributable to the inade-
quate conditions of the prison." The lawsuit alleged violations of the
inmates' constitutional rights embodied in the First, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.' The litigation ultimately resulted in a
United States Supreme Court decision which adopted a more flexible
standard under which courts may modify a consent decree in institu-
tional reform litigation."
The prison facility, known as the Charles Street Jail, had been in
use since 18485 and had been the subject of seven different government
studies from 1949 to 1970 that criticized the structure.6 The district
court held that incarceration of pretrial detainees at the Charles Street
facility violated the fundamental liberties of presumptively innocent cit-
izens awaiting trial and was "punishment" to such a degree that it vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7  The
1. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
2. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973).
3. Id. at 677-78. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations were based upon
"structural inadequacies, poor plumbing, space limitations, inadequate diet and health care, inade-
quate exercise and recreation, and inadequate provision for personal hygiene .. " Id. at 678.
The First and Sixth Amendments formed the basis for a second category of requested relief. The
plaintiffs argued that the inmates were primarily pretrial detainees, not convicts, and, therefore,
were entitled to greater access to counsel, family, friends, books, magazines, and periodicals. Id. at
678-79.
4. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 765.
5. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. at 679.
6. Id. at 681. Most of the studies recommended that the facility be abandoned and a new
one constructed. Id.
7. Id. at 686. The court stated that when dealing with pretrial detainees a Fourteenth
Amendment analysis was more appropriate than an Eighth Amendment analysis. Nevertheless,
certain Eighth Amendment considerations also applied in this case. Id. at 688.
The court stated that the limitations on the liberty of a detainee must be weighed against the
state's sole purpose of holding him for trial. That purpose must be achieved by narrowly tailored
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court permanently enjoined the defendants "(a) from housing at the
Charles Street Jail after November 30, 1973 in a cell with another
inmate, any inmate who is awaiting trial and (b) from housing at the
Charles Street Jail after June 30, 1976 any inmate who is awaiting
trial." 8
The defendants did not appeal the judgment, but by mid-Novem-
ber 1973, they informed the district court that the November 30 dead-
line could not be met.9 The court ordered the defendant Commissioner
of Correction to comply; he appealed the order without success.'"
The defendants succeeded in postponing the June 30, 1976 dead-
line for the discontinued use of Charles Street as a pretrial detainee
facility.1 In order to achieve a constitutionally adequate pretrial de-
tainee center, the district court, in November 1977, ordered the City
Council to appropriate the funds to establish such a center.,2 The order
was appealed and again affirmed, establishing October 2, 1978 as the
date upon which the Charles Street Jail was to be closed as a pretrial
detainee facility.'8
As a result of the 1977 order, the parties to the lawsuit signed a
consent decree in April 1979, which required that inmates be housed in
single cells in a new facility to be constructed by 1983.1' The facility's
means in order to protect fundamental personal liberties. Id. at 686. The deprivations at issue
included ancient, leaky plumbing; cell toilets that often overflowed creating a fecal smell; rodent,
roach, and mosquito infested cells; inadequate heat, health care, and fire protection; old, soiled
mattresses; nutritionally inadequate meals; cramped living quarters; and time outside of cells lim-
ited to four and one-half hours per day. Id. at 679-83.
The court based its conclusions upon expert testimony, "voluminous" documentary evidence,
affidavits of the inmates; and a viewing of the facility by Judge Garrity and his law clerk, includ-
ing an unannounced overnight stay in a cell. Id. at 678.
8. Id. at 691. The court found that the inmates were double-celled in tiny cells for 19 to 21
hours per day and could be detained awaiting trial from five months to a year, or longer. Id. at
679-82.
9. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (lst Cir.
1974).
10. Id. at 1198. The crowding at the jail could only be relieved by transferring inmates to
other facilities outside Suffolk County and only the Commissioner had the statutory power to
authorize the transfers. After he refused to cooperate, the district court ordered compliance. The
First Circuit, relying on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
upheld the order as within the court's equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations. Id. at
1198.
1I. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98 (1st Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 99.
13. Id. at 100.
14. Attorney General of Mass. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 362 (Mass.
1985).
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size was based upon projections of the anticipated jail population,
which proved inaccurate by 1984 when the entire correctional system
was overcrowded."5 Due to the noncompliance of city officials in allevi-
ating the overcrowding, the Attorney General of Massachusetts filed
suit against the sheriff in 1984.16 The suit resulted in a modification to
the consent decree that would increase the number of cells in the new
jail and thus assure future compliance with the 1979 decree. 17 One of
the conditions for approval of the modification was the maintenance of
single cell occupancy.' 8
In 1989, the sheriff sought a further modification of the decree to
allow double-bunking of some inmate detainees.' 9 The sheriff moved
for the modification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(5) and (6).20 The district court ruled that there had not been a
change in law or a change in fact to support the modification.2
The court considered two standards for modification of consent de-
crees.22 As interpreted by the court, the more stringent standard set by
United States v. Swift & Co.2" required a showing of "grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions. '24 A more flexible standard,
applied in more recent cases by some courts, did not require that the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 362-63. By October, 1984, the construction of the new jail had not yet begun even
though the 1979 consent decree had set the completion date for 1983. Id.
17. Id. at 363.
18. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 563 (D. Mass. 1990).
19. Id. at 562. The sheriff proposed confining the inmates to cells of approximately 70
square feet of floor space for twelve hours per day, eight hours at night, and four hours during the
day. The sheriff relied on statistics to show that 25% of the pretrial detainees are released within
two days and 50% within eight days. These statistics were contested by the plaintiffs. Id. at 564.
20. Id. at 563, 565. The modification of a consent decree may be based upon a change in
law or a change in material facts which occurred subsequent to the initial decree. The change in
the law asserted by the sheriff was the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979), which was decided one week after the district court's original approval of
the consent decree in 1979. Id. at 564. In Bell the Court clarified the law regarding conditions for
confinement of pretrial detainees. The Court held that the test to determine the constitutionality
of pretrial detention was whether the practice amounted to punishment of the detainee. Bell, 441
U.S. at 535. The Court further held that double-ceiling was not per se unconstitutional. Id. at
541-42. The change in facts asserted by the sheriff was the continuing and unanticipated increase
in pretrial detainee populations. Kearney, 734 F.Supp. at 564.
21. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 564. The court found that Bell did not overrule any legal
interpretation upon which the 1979 consent decree had relied to establish a constitutionally ade-
quate facility. Id. at 563-64. The overcrowding was found to be neither a new nor an unforeseen
condition and therefore did not support modification. Id.
22. Id. at 563, 565.
23. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
24. Id. at 119.
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change in circumstances necessarily be unforeseen .2  The court found
that neither standard could support the sheriff's motion.2 6 Judge Kee-
ton stated that even if he were to apply the flexible standard, the modi-
fication could still not be granted. The modification would defeat the
purpose of the consent decree by eliminating a primary element of the
relief originally sought-separate cells for detainees.2 7 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the decision of the district court.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari."9
The Court adopted the flexible standard for modification of con-
sent decrees in institutional reform litigation. 0 The Court concluded
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits the flexible stan-
dard for relief from a decree where prospective application is no longer
equitable.3 1 The Court held that the party moving for modification
must satisfy a two-part requirement."2 First, the party must establish a
significant change in fact or law.33 Second, the party must show that
"the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circum-
stance."3 4 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A consent decree is a negotiated agreement reached between two
parties in settlement of litigation.3 5 After court approval, the decree is
either signed by the judge or embodied in a separate order.3 6 Charac-
teristics of both a private contract and an injunction combine to form
the hybrid known as a consent decree.
7
25. See Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,. 488 U.S. 897 (1988); New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 915 (1983); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981); Philadelphia Welfare Rights
Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
26. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 565.
27. id.
28. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 928 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991).
29. 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
30. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 765 (1992).
31. Id. at 758.
32. Id. at 760.
33. Id.
34. id.
35. Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litiga-
tion, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 725.
36. Id. at 726.
37. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
See also Anderson, supra note 35, at 726.
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The contract component comes from the parties drafting a com-
promise to settle the litigation." The parties are free to define their
rights and duties in the settlement." Utilizing the parties' technical
knowledge of the situation, the consent decree creates a more individu-
alized and feasible approach than a judicial decree.' 0 This negotiated
decree promotes cooperation and compliance more than a court-struc-
tured order."1
The injunctive element results from judicial approval and the
court's order compelling compliance.' The decree is as enforceable as
other judgments.' Enforcement may be accomplished by a spectrum of
judicial powers including interpretation of a provision, injunctions, or
contempt sanctions."
In addition to the negotiation and enforcement advantages, the
consent decree saves time, expense, and the risk of litigation.'5 It can
also provide greater relief to the plaintiffs than could be obtained at
trial.46
A court's power to fashion and effectuate decrees is guided by eq-
uitable principles. 47 The jurisdiction of the American equity courts
evolved to allow expansive remedies capable of vindicating individual
rights, especially constitutional rights, when the law courts proved in-
38. Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII: Consent Decrees and
the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894.
39. Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72
HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317 (1959).
40. Anderson, supra note 35, at 726-27. But see Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1986)
(arguing that a consent decree may turn out to be less durable than a litigated order if the parties
have unequal bargaining power, unequal access to information, or incentives to place risks on
nonrepresented persons to the negotiations). See also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
673, 681-82 (1971) ("[T]he resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the
respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.").
41. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 899.
42. Anderson, supra note 35, at 726.
43. Note, supra note 39, at 1316.
44. Anderson, supra note 35, at 728-29.
45. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). On the other hand, the
Court pointed out that each party risked compromising a term which might be won in litigation.
Id.
46. See Local Number 93, 478 U.S. at 523-25. See also Wagner v. Warnasch, 295 S.W.2d
890 (Tex. 1956) (affirming a consent decree which required the specific performance of construc-
tion work). But see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (holding
that an injunction was improper because it imposed on the parties as an adjunct of settlement
something that could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial). Id. at 579.
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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adequate."8 Through the use of injunctions, equity developed expansive
and innovative doctrines not bound by legal remedies and precedents.4 9
Traditionally, the injunction gave negative orders prohibiting an act
rather than requiring affirmative action.8 0 At the end of the nineteenth
century, the use of injunctive relief to order affirmative action became
more prominent.5 ' As a result, equity used the affirmative decree,
which had the force of law, to direct the conduct of the parties before
the court. 5
The federal courts have increased the use of consent decrees as a
broad, new public law field developed. 53 Plaintiffs began asking the
courts to restructure and supervise the reform of institutional programs
rather than to simply correct an isolated violation of the law." Institu-
tional reform litigation evolved to redesign the operation of large, pub-
lic organizations.5 5 The organizations were often state bureaucracies56
such as school systems, prisons, mental hospitals, welfare programs,
public housing projects, 57 and other large scale employers capable of
affecting the job market through discriminatory practices.58 The ad-
ministration of public programs often threatened constitutional rights
or violated statutory provisions.59 Constitutional rights involved in re-
form litigation included equality, due process, liberty, security of the
person, and no cruel or unusual punishment. 60 In prison and mental
institution cases, the decrees address unconstitutional conditions such
as space availability, health services, sanitation, recreation, job train-
48. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 DUKE LJ. 1265, 1270-71.
49. Id. at 1271.
50. 4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1337, at 934 (5th ed.
1941).
51. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1293 (1976).
52. id.
53. Anderson, supra note 35, at 725. See also Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 894, 934
(stating that 88 % of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Title VII suits from 1972
to 1983 were settled by consent decrees).
54. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change
in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 44 (1979).
55. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979).
56. Id. at 2.
57. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1266.
58. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 899.
59. Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1982).
60. Fiss, supra note 55, at 11.
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ing, and staffing ratios.61 The judge, through a consent decree or in-
junction, confronts the state bureaucracy and attempts to remove the
constitutional threat by restructuring the organization.6 2 The role of
the court becomes not so much to settle a dispute, but to define consti-
tutional values and correct the conditions within the organization that
threaten constitutional rights.68
During the 1960s, certain events occurred which paved the way for
institutional reform litigation. 4 First, the federal courts became active
in school desegration and thrust the courts into social reconstruction.65
Next, the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr 6 redefined the political
question doctrine and upheld judicial expansion into states' legislative
reapportionment.6 " Once Baker declared that reapportionment was a
justiciable issue, the justiciability of other issues followed and removed
previous barriers restricting the courts' interference in the internal af-
fairs of both legislative and administrative governmental bodies.6 8 The
courts then began reshaping prisons, welfare administrations, mental
hospitals, and housing authorities.6 9
Enactment of federal antidiscrimination statutes further promoted
61. Chayes, supra note 59, at 51.
62. Fiss, supra note 55, at 11. The federal courts became the forum in which to attack these
institutions. Diver, supra note 54, at 49.
63. Jost, supra note 40, at 1118. The reform litigation was "to give meaning to constitu-
tional values in the operation of large-scale organizations." Fiss, supra note 55, at 5. A particular
incident, such as discrimination or police brutality, may initiate the litigation, but the focus is on a
social condition that threatens constitutional rights. Id. at 18. The plaintiff sues the institution to
obtain long-term reform of the institution rather than compensation. See id. at 22-23. The plain-
tiff is usually a class challenging government actions. Chayes, supra note 59, at 27. The victim of
the actions is not an individual but a group. Fiss, supra note 55, at 19.
64. See Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1266-69.
65. See Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1279-81. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), undertook to restructure the organization of the school system. The
Court continued to uphold the federal courts' affirmative actions promoting desegregation. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES
(1981) (examining the lower courts efforts to enforce the desegregation requirements of Brown).
66. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
67. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1280.
68. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1280. The Baker court held that "the mere fact that the
suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question." 369 U.S. at
209. The Court then examined areas previously considered nonjusticiable and discussed circum-
stances where adjudication would be proper in those areas. Id. at 210-17.
69. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1280. By 1981, prison conditions litigation was pending in
three-fourths of the states. Id. at 1281.
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institutional reform litigation by creating individual rights which were
often violated by the management of large, public institutions."0 The
alleged violation of these rights initiated litigation to decide the validity
of certain governmental action or inaction.7" The courts had to inter-
pret the statues7 2 and enforce the rights of a litigant, such as a pris-
oner, welfare recipient, or school child, compelled to be in a long-term
relationship with the defendant institution.
73
Once the reform litigation is initiated, the controversy often
culminates in a consent decree."' The court, by its approval of the de-
cree, utilizes judicial authority to achieve the operational reform of
large, government institutions.7 5 Consent decrees are complicated docu-
ments designed to bring about reform over a period of yearse.7  The
complexity and time span of the institutional decree created situations
where modification became necessary."' Given the prospective nature of
the decree, future changes in facts or the law or unanticipated effects
from the decree may require revision of the decree to accommodate the
changes.78 The ability of a court to modify the decree is essential since
the decree cannot provide for all future contingencies or simply may
prove to be unworkable.79 Fortunately, the ability to modify a decree is
70. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1282. The acts included various civil rights acts. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1988) (public education); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)
(employment); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); and Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). See also Chayes, supra note 59, at 6.
71. Chayes, supra note 59, at 9.
72. Horowitz, supra note 48, at 1281-83.
73. Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 511-12 (1980). The litigation arose from the con-
tinuing involvement between the American public and the large institutions. The litigant's well-
being and support may be dependent upon the institution, and most of the time the court cannot
sever the relationship between the plaintiff and the institutional defendant. Instead, the court must
implement prospective and complex decrees to safeguard the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
74. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 888. The consent decree can be an alternative to litiga-
tion and may occur before trial or after substantial litigation on the merits. Id. at 900-02, 907,
911. Prior to approving the decree, the court may hold a fairness hearing about the proposed
consent decree and its consequences. This provides an opportunity for litigants to voice suggestions
or objections to the decree's provisions. Id. at 911-12.
75. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 888. See also supra note 42-44 and accompanying
text. The federal courts' involvement raises the issues of comity and deference to state officials on
fiscal matters. The federal court must be cognizant of budgetary limitations, but not allow consti-
tutional violations to go unremedied. Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 506-07. See also Anderson,
supra note 35, at 742-44.
76. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 899.
77. See also Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758 (1992).
78. Jost, supra note 40, at 1104-05.
79. Anderson, supra note 35, at 727. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 391
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inherent in a court's equity power. 80
The courts' historic power to modify a decree is codified in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 1 In response to a party's motion, Rule
60(b) gives a court the power to grant relief from final judgments.
8 2
This rule gives the issuing court continuing responsibility and equitable
powers over the prospective operation of the decree. 83 Even though
Rule 60(b)(5) sets out three grounds for relief, the most significant
ground allows relief when prospective application of the final judgment
is no longer equitable.8 The courts have "wide discretion" when con-
sidering a motion to modify.
8 5
Prior to the enactment of Rule 60(b)(5),the Supreme Court in
United States v. Swift & Co.8 recognized a court's inherent power to
modify prospective decrees "as events may shape the need." 8 Setting
the standard to use in modification requests, the Court held that
"[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new
and unforeseen conditions" would support revision.88 The Swift consent
decree was a complex, detailed compromise ending a long and bitter
antitrust dispute between the United States and leading meat pack-
ers.89 The defendant meat packers, citing changes in the grocery busi-
ness, sought the revision to eliminate restrictions imposed by the de-
U.S. 244, 249 (1968) (holding that modification was justified if the decree failed to achieve its
original purpose).
80. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). The Court stated that it was
irrelevant whether the decree was by consent or litigation. The Court noted that the power existed
either by reservation of the right within the decree's terms or "by force of principles inherent in
the jurisdiction of the chancery." Id.
81. 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2961, at 598-99 (1982).
82. Id. § 2863, at 204. The Rule applies to any judgment with prospective relief. Id. at 205.
83. Id. § 2961, at 599.
84. Id. § 2863, at 204.
85. See System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 648 (1961). See also II WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 81, § 2961, at 599-600.
86. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
87. Id. at 114.
88. Id. at 119. An early draft by Justice Cardozo was found among his personal papers
stating that originally Cardozo affirmed the modification. Cardozo found that the decree worked a
hardship on the defendants and the public and wrote: "A judgment for a continuing injunction
involves a forecast of the future, which has been known to belie its prophets whether seated on the
bench or elsewhere. The greater is the need therefore to strip the forecast of finality and leave a
pathway for retreat." Jost, supra note 40, at Ill n.73.
89. Jost, supra note 40, at 1107-08. Consent decrees first gained prominence in antitrust
litigation. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 888.
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cree.90 The Court reversed the district court's order granting
modification. 9' The Court found that the changed circumstances were
outweighed by the continuing existence of the original dangers that
supported the decree and the lack of undue hardship on the defendants
by continued enforcement."2 However, the Court recognized the need to
modify a decree when changed circumstances turned it into "an instru-
ment of wrong" and noted that a decree is not an abandonment of the
right to future revision.9"
Granting an antitrust decree modification in Chrysler Corp. v.
United States,"4 the Court reasoned that the change was necessary to
effectuate the basic purpose of the original consent decree.95 Contrary
to Swift, where the defendants sought the modification, the plaintiff
government in Chrysler, citing changed facts, requested the modifica-
tion."6 The modification in Chrysler granted the government a time ex-
tension for compliance with a term of the decree.97
The Court in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.98
again allowed a modification sought by the plaintiff government.99 The
district court had denied the modification relying upon the stringent
standard established in Swift. °0 The Court held that the eleven year
old decree had not achieved its purpose and that modification was
proper when a decree failed to achieve its goals.' Further, the United
Shoe Court said that Swift was not intended to ban all modifications
and that modification would be possible upon an appropriate show-
ing. '0 However, the decree cannot be modified to benefit defendants
seeking to avoid the achievement or responsibilities of the decree's pur-
pose.'03 The Court noted that the plaintiffs in United Shoe sought the
90. Swift, 286 U.S. at 111-13.
91. Id. at 120.
92. Id. at 119.
93. Id. at 115.
94. 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
95. Id. at 562.
96. Id. at 560. The Court allowed the government modification of the time limit to resolve
its ongoing litigation with General Motors. The result of the General Motor's litigation would be
used to determine the rights between the United States and Chrysler in their decree. Id. at 563.
97. Id.
98. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
99. Id. at 249. The government alleged that the eleven year old decree had not achieved its
purpose of establishing "workable competition" in the industry. Id. at 246-47.
100. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 329-30 (D. Mass. 1967).
101. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 249.




modification to better achieve the decree's purpose and, therefore, mod-
ification was not precluded by Swift.
10 '
In contrast to the factual changes relied upon in United Shoe and
Chrysler, a change in law resulted in modification in Railway Employ-
ees' Department v. Wright.1"" In Wright, the parties' consent decree
prohibited the carrier and union shops from forming agreements dis-
criminating against nonunion employees, which was also prohibited
under the Railway Labor Act.'0 6 After an amendment to the Railway
Labor Act was passed allowing union shops, the defendant union
moved for modification of the decree. 10 7 The district court, denying the
request, held that the amendment did not nullify or prohibit the agree-
ment and, therefore, the parties should be left to their agreement. 0 8
Overruling the district court's ruling, the Court, citing Swift, held that
a court should not ignore significant changes in law or facts and turn
the decree into an "instrument of wrong." 109 The Court also recognized
that the need to modify a decree in light of subsequent changes to pre-
vent the decree from becoming an "instrument of wrong"" 0 must be
balanced against the need for the parties' reliance on a decree's con-
tinuity."' However, the Court emphasized that there was no disputing
that changes may call for modification."
2
Despite the Supreme Court's decisions that quoted Swift for al-
lowing modification, some district courts continued to apply the strict
standard of Swift and required evidence of undue hardship before al-
lowing modification."' These courts maintained that the consent decree
should not be modified except in exceptional circumstances." 4 How-
ever, other district courts recognized that the institutional reform de-
104. Id. at 249.
105. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
106. Id. at 643-44.
107. Id. at 644-45.
108. Id: at 645-46.
109. Id. at 647.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932)).
Ill. Id. at 647-48.
112. Id. at 648.
113. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969) (relying on Swift's strict standard to deny modification in a trade-
mark litigation case). See also Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981)
(adhering to the strict standard of Swift to deny modification); Williams v. Lesiak, 822 F.2d 1223
(Ist Cir. 1987) (citing the grievous wrong standard of Swift and remanding).
114. See Rajender v. University of Minn., 730 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1984); Roberts, 653
F.2d at 174; Humble Oil, 405 F.2d at 813.
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crees required greater flexibility than the strict Swift standard 1 5 and
struggled in their attempts to address modification." 6 The courts be-
came more flexible in reviewing modification requests, but lacked con-
sistency in the approaches taken.117
One approach allowed modification when a new appreciation of
the facts1 8 or unforeseen changes in law or facts necessitated revision
to effectuate the decree's purpose.1 ' Often, the courts cited Swift to
support a holding that changed events could necessitate revision 2 and
distinguished Swift when the modification was sought to better achieve
the decree's goals.12
In another approach, the courts balanced the moving party's need
for modification against the impact of modification upon the general
public.12 2 Courts applied this analysis in cases involving overcrowded
prisons in which an alternative to modification was the early release of
inmates. 23 The courts of appeals reversed district courts that refused
modification when the public interest was endangered and found an
abuse of discretion if the public interest was not adequately weighed. 12"
The good faith compliance record of the party moving for modifi-
115. See Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989); Newman v. Graddick,
740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (lth Cir. 1984); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
706 F.2d 956, 969-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d
420, 424 (4th Cir. 1981); Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-21
(3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
116. Jost, supra note 40, at 1106.
117. Jost, supra note 40, at 1106, 1113.
118. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., 418 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1969).
Although not an institutional reform case, King-Seeley was often cited to support modification not
only for a change in facts but also when a passage of time enhanced the significance of previously
known facts and indicated the decree was unsuccessful in accomplishing its purpose. Jost, supra
note 40, at 1117.
119. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 968 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1981).
120. See Carey, 706 F.2d at 967. Judge Friendly's opinion in Carey is often credited with
developing the flexible approach for modification of consent decrees in institutional reform litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 768 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1981).
121. See Carey, 706 F.2d at 969; King-Seeley, 418 F.2d at 35.
122. Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897 (1988); Duran
v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1985).
123. See Plyler, 846 F.2d at 212; Duran, 760 F.2d at 759. See also Twelve John Does v.
District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (agreeing that the public interest must be
weighed but the threat to the public must be supported by actual evidence of the release pro-
gram's danger).
124. See, e.g.. Plyler, 846 F.2d at 212; Duran, 760 F.2d at 759.
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cation came under scrutiny in other courts.1"5 While it was not clear if
this was a requirement for modification or just another factor to con-
sider,1"6 total compliance with the decree was not mandatory for modi-
fication.1 27 Some courts also acknowledged that the focus must be on
the central purpose of the decree and not just the fulfillment of each
single term.1
28
During the time that the lower courts were setting a more flexible
modification standard than that indicated by Swift, the Supreme Court
again addressed the issue of modification of consent decrees in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts.12 9 Stotts involved a con-
sent decree between the Memphis Fire Department and minority group
employees. The decree was meant to increase the number of blacks
hired and promoted within the department.' In 1981 projected budget
deficits required citywide layoffs of nonessential personnel. This was ac-
complished through a seniority system of "last hired, first fired." ' 1 Mi-
nority members asked the district court to enjoin the layoff procedure
as a direct conflict with the 1974 consent decree's terms since most of
the recently hired employees were black.13" Reversing the district
court's injunction prohibiting the firing, the Supreme Court denied the
requested relief because (1) the injunction improperly granted relief
beyond the scope and contemplation of the decree, 3 and (2) the de-
125. See Plyler, 846'F.2d at 213; Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 295-96 (7th Cir. 1983);
Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1026 (1980); Mitchell v. Helena Wholesale Inc., 163 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
126. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
127. Badgley v. Santacroce, 853 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988); Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d
1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
128. See Plyler, 846 F.2d at 212-13; Carey, 706 F.2d at 970 n.17. The Plyler court was
asked to modify a prison consent decree which prohibited double-ceiling of inmates. The court
found that the central goal of the decree was to provide constitutionally required prison conditions
and that to focus solely on the double-ceiling provision was inappropriate. The court stated that
the prisoners had received the essence of their bargain, and their confinement exceeded constitu-
tional requirements even without single ceiling. Plyler, 846 F.2d at 212-13. See also Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 862 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying modification because it would abrogate the
primary purpose of the decree).
129. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
130. Id. at 556.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 564-66.
133. Id. at 574-75. The Court stated that the scope of the consent decree can only be deter-
mined by looking within its four corners and not by considering what might further the purpose of
one of the parties. The Stotts decree did not mention layoffs, demotions, or an intent not to follow
the existing seniority system, and, therefore, the injunction exceeded the terms of the decree and
was impermissible. Id.
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cree's modification would create a conflict between the decree and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964134 which allows bona fide seniority
systems. 13 5 Exhibiting judicial disarray over the correct approach for
modification, the Stotts Court wrote four opinions, each presenting sep-
arate considerations for modification.' 36 Thus, Stotts left uncertainty
among the lower courts as to whether a barrier to modification was
created or whether the holding applied only to the substantive issues
raised in Title VII litigation.
37
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN RUFO
Recently, however, the Court recognized a need for flexibility in
school desegregation decrees and granted modification in Board of Ed-
ucation v. Dowell.'s8 The Swift standard was rejected as inappropriate
when considering modification of school desegregation decrees. 3 9 The
Court recognized that a relevant factor to weigh when considering
modification was a school's good faith compliance with the decree.'"
The Court limited the reasoning to school desegregation decrees, never
addressing the broad issue of institutional reform decrees."4 Specifi-
cally addressing institutional reform litigation in Rufo v. Inmates of
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination
due to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Title VII litigation.is an example of the public
law or institutional reform litigation that often is resolved by consent decrees. Schwarzschild,
supra note 38, at 890-901.
135. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576-77.
136. Jost, supra note 40, at 1121-24. First, the majority opinion by Justice White dealt
primarily with the substantive issues of employment discrimination. However, addressing the mod-
ification of a consent decree, Justice White restricted the modification if the resulting order would
be inconsistent with the law. The terms of the decree and equity cannot be the sole consideration.
In one of the concurring opinions, Justice O'Connor also found that the decree must be tailored to
prevent conflicts with the law. Additionally, she maintained that modification is inappropriate
without weighing the public interest. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that
a consent decree became a final judgment and a legally enforceable obligation. A foreseeable
changed circumstance, as in Stotts, he argued, prohibits modification. Finally, Justice Blackmun,
in his dissenting opinion, argued for flexibility in modification, especially in civil rights litigation in
which accurate foresight is unattainable. The modification should enforce the intent of the parties
reflected in the decree. Id.
137. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEo. L.J. 1041 (1985) (stating
the holding is directed toward the narrow substantive issues more than modification issues); The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 267 (1984) (suggesting the
holding is directed at the narrow issue of Title VII consent decrees related to seniority systems).
138. 111 S. Ct. 608 (1991).
139. Id. at 637.
140. Id. at 637-38.
141. See Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 630.
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the Suffolk County Jail,42 the Court established the standard for mod-
ification and discussed various considerations in a modification
request.14
First, the Court addressed the Swift standard and found that the
particular facts in Swift created the "grievous wrong" standard, but
that Swift did not foreclose modification when changed events necessi-
tated revision.1"' Also, the Court stated that the Swift standard was not
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), permitting a flexible
standard for modification. 145 The Court determined that institutional
decrees increase the need for flexibility due to the long-term force of
the decree, the likelihood of change occurring in this extended time
period, and the impact on the public interest in efficient institutions.
14 6
The Court adopted a two tier standard which the moving party must
satisfy.147 First, the party must establish a significant change in cir-
cumstances that warrants the modification.1 48 If this standard is met,
the party must then demonstrate that "the proposed modification is
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance[s]." "49 This two part
standard must be satisfied when the party seeks modification of a de-
cree's term "that arguably relates to the vindication of a constitutional
right."
1 50
In order to comply with the first requirement, the moving party
must show that a significant change in either law or fact warrants revi-
sion." 1 A factual change can sustain modification when compliance is
made more onerous, when unforeseen obstacles make the decree un-
workable, or when compliance becomes detrimental to the public inter-
est.152 The fact that the condition was reasonably foreseeable will not
142. 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 757-58. The Court also examined past Supreme Court decisions that emphasized
flexibility. Id.
145. Id. The Court noted that Rule 60(b)(5) allows relief when enforcement is no longer
equitable, not "when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms." Id. at 760.
146. Id. at 758-59.
147. Id. at 760.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 760 n.7. Ordinarily, a minor change request should receive party consent, but
the court can grant the request, over protest, when the moving party shows a reasonable basis for
the request. Id.




foreclose modification.15 The litigants are not required to foresee all
factual changes that could occur,154 and a moving party will not as-
sume sole responsibility for inadequate foresight. 15 However, if an
event is anticipated by the parties and the decree is agreed to nonethe-
less, the moving party bears a heavy burden to prove its good faith and
reasonable efforts toward compliance before modification will be
granted. 156 Thus, the Rufo Court directed the district court on remand
to determine whether the increase in the Suffolk County inmate popu-
lation was anticipated by the government and relied upon in the con-
sent decree. 5 ' Appraising the situation, the Court found it significant
that the 1985 modified consent decree referred to the jail population
increases as unanticipated. 58 Also, the Court found it strange that the
respondent inmates agreed to the inadequate new jail size if an upsurge
in prison population was foreseen. 1
9
The Court held that the district court also erred in its conclusion
that modification was not possible, under any standard, because it
would violate a primary purpose of the decree.' The Court reasoned
that the purpose of the decree was to remedy the totality of unconstitu-
tional conditions within the Charles Street jail and not just to provide
single cells for pretrial detainees.'' Therefore, even though the single-
celling was an undertaking of the decree, modification of a single term
does not violate the decree's purpose aimed at providing constitutional
jail conditions.' 62
Next, the Court examined when a change in law is sufficient to
establish the initial burden for granting modification. 6 3 A change in
law that makes an obligation impermissible under federal law must be
modified.6 However, a change that makes legal what the decree pre-
vents or a change clarifying the law may warrant modification but does
not require it.' 65 As examples of changes in law affecting a modifica-
153. Id. at 761 n.10.
154. Id. at 760.
155. Id. at 761 n.10.




160. Id. at 759.







tion request, the Court referred to two prior court decisions. 166 First,
citing Railway Employees' Department v. Wright, 67 the Court ac-
knowledged that modification was possible when a change in law oc-
curred which permitted an act previously held illegal by the law ex-
isting at the time of the decree's formation.' 6 8 Next, the Court referred
to Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts'0 9 to illustrate a situa-
tion for denying modification when the resulting obligation would con-
flict with the law.
17 0
The Suffolk County Commissioner had argued that a change of
law in Bell v. Wolfish,1 7 1 decided after the Charles Street decree was
signed, required modification because the Bell Court announced for the
first time that double celling was not always unconstitutional. 17  How-
ever, the Rufo Court ruled that modification was not required since
Bell did not change the legality of single-celling that the government
agreed to provide.173 The Court noted the possibility, though, that the
government had been unsure of the constitutionality of double-ceiling
on the decree's date and granted single cells believing that the law re-
quired it.17 ' The later clarification of the law may support modification
when the parties base the agreement on a misunderstanding of the law
and later prove that there had been a misunderstanding.
17 5
After proving a significant change in law or fact sufficient to grant
modification, the moving party must then meet the second tier of the
modification standard. 76 The party must submit a proposed modifica-
tion "suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.'
77
When the district court evaluates the proposed modification, three
factors must be clear.7 8 First, the modification cannot create or perpet-
166. Id.
167. 364 U.S. 642 (1961). See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
168. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
169. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
170. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
171. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
172. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 763.
175. Id. On remand, the district court must decide if the government knew it was granting







uate a constitutional violation.17 9 Second, the modification must be tai-
lored to resolve only the problems created by the change in law or
facts.18 The purpose of modification is not to rewrite the decree to con-
form with the constitutional floor. 181 The parties had the right in the
original consent decree to bargain not only for greater benefits than the
Constitution requires but for more than the court could order absent
the settlement.182 The court should not reopen the negotiation any more
than equity requires. 83 Finally, the public interest and deference to lo-
cal government administration must be considered when determining if
the modification is suitably tailored.18 ' The courts may give deference
to the government when structuring the decree;'8" however, the govern-
ment does not receive deferential treatment when proving a change sig-
nificant enough to warrant modifying the consent decree.'8 6 Therefore,
fiscal constraints and concerns of public interest are legitimate consid-
erations in tailoring a proposed modification. 87
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that a proper
examination by appellate courts should focus on the method that the
district court used in ruling on a modification request.' 8 If relevant
considerations were accommodated in a reasonable way, then Justice
O'Connor would determine that the decision was not an abuse of
discretion. 189
Justice O'Connor emphasized that foreseeability is not a disposi-
tive factor and that balancing the public interest can outweigh other
considerations. 90 She also emphasized that even though fiscal resources
cannot excuse a constitutional violation, fiscal changes can provide the
basis for finding that the decree is no longer equitable.' 9'
However, Justice O'Connor maintained that the Court excessively
limited the district court's discretion by removing the option to refuse
modification for a single term regardless of the importance of that term
179. Id.




184. Id. at 764-65.
185. Id. at 764 n.14.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 764-65.
188. Id. at 765 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189. Id.




in the decree. 192
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Black-
mun, agreed that the flexible standard should be used in modification
of institutional reform decrees.' 93 Notwithstanding that agreement, the
dissent maintained that changes reasonably foreseeable at the time of
the initial negotiation should not support modification. 9 Justice Ste-
vens also insisted that one term may be so critical that its modification
would frustrate the core goals of the decree.' 95 A strict standard should
apply if modification goes to a central purpose of the decree. 196
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
In Rufo the Court finally adopted the flexible modification stan-
dard for institutional reform decrees and established criteria that a
moving party must satisfy before modification can be granted. How-
ever, the terms used by the Court provide wide latitude to the district
court's discretionary decision as to whether a significant change has
occurred that merits modification. Terms such as "changed factual
conditions" making compliance "more onerous"' 97 create an ambiguity
for the parties structuring the consent decree. The decree must effec-
tively embody the purposes each side has negotiated to accomplish and
create some degree of finality. The decree's finality is undermined by
allowing a difficulty in compliance to form the basis for a modification
request. The difficulty does not need to reach the level of impossibility
or impracticability but can be satisfied by an onerous standard. Re-
gardless of the skill utilized in drafting the decree, the district court
has the discretion to decide when compliance has become too onerous
to warrant continuing adherence. The long-term application of a con-
sent decree makes factual changes a virtual certainty, and the skill of
the negotiation process can be offset by the skill of the opposing party
in later portraying the oppressiveness of compliance.
Additionally, reliance upon the decree may be undermined by
opening back doors for the government to achieve modification. The
government may agree to conditions to save the expense of litigation
but later employ fiscal considerations or public interest arguments,
192. Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 772-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 760.
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combined with a change in circumstances, to erode the decree's provi-
sions. First, constraints are always present in governmental affairs and
could provide an avenue of attack upon a decree. The only concrete
restriction is that the modification cannot create a constitutional viola-
tion. Moreover, the government will not be foreclosed from obtaining
modification based on a change regardless of its foreseeability; how-
ever, if the changing event was anticipated and relied upon in the de-
cree, a modification is less likely to be granted. 98 Thus, the burden
shifts to the plaintiffs to anticipate events and incorporate the events
into the decree. The plaintiff will want to incorporate as many events as
possible into the decree to impose a higher standard of proof for modifi-
cation. Even then, fiscal constraints or public interest are strong factors
promoting modification.
Another significant problem is that no single term is safe from
modification, no matter how extensively negotiated. 99 Both the single
term provision and the absence of foreseeability requirement estab-
lished by the majority create drafting difficulties for the parties. The
plaintiff will not be assured that any single term within the decree is
safe, no matter how extensively bargained for or how important to the
decree's purpose. The plaintiff must now implement alternative meth-
ods to achieve a particular objective in the decree. For instance, in
prison cases when single-celling is desired, the plaintiff must negotiate
for supplementary conditions to guarantee the inmates' rights if single
cells are lost. This might be accomplished by setting a maximum num-
ber of hours spent in the cells or designating a hierarchy of inmate
classifications available to be single-celled. In order to protect the ex-
pectations of the decree, the drafting skills of the parties may provide
the most powerful tool to prevent frustration of the decree's terms.
The dissent fears that allowing litigants to avoid their commit-
ments will discourage consent decrees. However, a consent decree's ad-
vantages remain a settlement incentive even though the finality has
been undermined. The parties would still avoid the time and expense of
trial and avoid the risk of losing the case at trial. Also, the Rufo Court
acknowledged that the parties can negotiate for greater relief than the
judge would grant after a trial."' 0 This factor makes the consent decree
very inviting to an institutional reform plaintiff. For instance, Title VII
.198. Id. at 761.
199. Id. at 762.
200. Id. at 759-60.
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employment discrimination plaintiffs may incorporate racial or gender
quotas within the consent decree. The quotas stipulate that a certain
proportion of all vacancies must be filled by minorities. 0 1 The Supreme
Court has never upheld quotas as a court ordered remedy"22 but the
Rufo Court concedes that the parties' negotiations may achieve greater
benefits than litigation.2"'
The dissent advocated adhering to a strict standard for modifica-
tion requests that impair the central purpose of a consent decree. This
solution would allow flexibility for modification and yet promote the
credibility of important terms. Under the majority's standard, the mod-
ification cannot be unlawful, unconstitutional, or reduce the decree to a
constitutional minimum, but otherwise a significant change makes
nothing sacred. The majority view disregards the parties' legitimate ex-
pectations by denying that any one term deserves protection from mod-
ification. Even though it is true that a decree's purpose is to safeguard
the totality of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the majority's conten-
tion that no single term can embody the decree's purpose disregards
and defeats the parties' expectations. The concurrence and the dissent
recognize that some terms may be critical to the decree's core goal and
these terms merit protection. This protection is denied by the Rufo de-
cision. The majority overlooks the dissent's argument that a more strin-
gent modification standard could be imposed for critical terms and still
not foreclose modification. The majority also disregards the dissent's
argument that the government may have other solutions available to
respond to a problem such as prison overcrowding. The fact that
double-celling provides the government the easiest and most economical
solution is not a sufficient justification to compromise the decree's pur-
pose and the parties' expectations. 04 The Rufo decision resolved the
lower court's confusion as to whether a flexible modification standard is
appropriate for institutional reform litigation, but the court created
confusion for the parties attempting to negotiate and draft a decree
capable of binding the state government's future compliance.
Donna Wolfe
201. See Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 896.
202. Schwarzschild, supra note 38, at 896.
203. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 759-60.
204. Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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